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1. Introduction 
In 2010, the Expert Committee on Freedom of Association of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) received a complaint referred to it by the Irish Congress of 
Trade Unions (ICTU). The complaint related to the lack of legal protection afforded to 
the practice of collective bargaining in Ireland. This article analyses the complaint, 
the Committee’s recommendations and the response to date of the Irish 
Government. However, the article argues that there are lessons to be drawn of 
importance beyond the confines of Irish law. The article proceeds as follows. First, 
an overview of the law relating to collective bargaining in Ireland is presented. The 
Committee of Experts system of the ILO is then briefly described. The article goes on 
to consider in detail the complaint made against Ireland to the ILO, the 
recommendations of the Committee of Experts and the response of the Irish 
government. The article then draws out some key implications from this situation, 
focusing on the role of collective bargaining in the ‘Anglo’ model of industrial 
relations; the influence of the judiciary in interpreting and protecting collective labour 
rights; the influence of global multinational corporations on labour law and practice; 
and the effect of the EU institutions on labour rights in the context of the current 
crisis. 
 
  
 3 
2. Collective Bargaining and Voluntarism 
Different ‘models’ of employment relations exist throughout the world. Indeed, even 
in Europe, while there are certain features common to all European countries (the 
recognition of the rights of workers to organise, at least in the sense of a freedom to 
join trade unions, a degree of State intervention in the labour/capital relationship and 
the existence of a relatively developed welfare State, to name a few) it cannot be 
said that there is a ‘European model’ of employment relations.1 The Irish system of 
employment relations, derived as it is from that of the UK, has traditionally been 
classified as adversarial and voluntarist. ‘Adversarialism’ refers to a situation where 
there is a strong ‘them and us’ relationship between the capital and labour and each 
side sees its interests as clearly divergent.2 ‘Voluntarism’ refers to a system where 
the preference is for joint trade union and employer regulation of employment 
relations and the relative absence of legal intervention. Voluntarism is premised on 
freedom of contract (Kahn-Freund, acknowledging the power imbalance in the 
employment relationship, referred to the employment contract as the great 
‘indispensible figment of the legal mind’)3 and freedom of association, whereby the 
employment relationship is essentially regulated by free collective bargaining 
between worker and employer representative groups.4 In such a model, there is no 
rejection of public intervention or labour law but the role of the State is seen to be 
primarily to provide a supportive framework for collective bargaining and the 
‘principal purpose of labour law is to regulate, support and restrain the power of 
                                               
1
 Crouch, C., Industrial Relations and European State Traditions (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993). 
2
 Hyman, R., ‘Industrial Relations in Europe: Theory and Practice’ European Journal of Industrial 
Relations (1995), 1(1), p. 17. 
3
 Kahn-Freund, O., Labour and the Law (London, Stevens, 1977), p. 18.  
4
 Doherty, M., ‘Institutional Challenge: Tribunals, Industrial Relations and the Law’ Employment Law 
Review (2009), 2, p. 70. 
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management and organised labour’.5 The implications of this were that Irish (and 
British) employers and unions traditionally viewed with disfavour employment 
legislation, so that voluntary collective bargaining was a key element in the 
functioning of the employment relations system.  
 Under Article 40.6.1°(iii) of the Irish Constitution, the State guarantees liberty 
for the exercise (subject to public order and morality) of the right of citizens to form 
associations and unions. However, the Article also provides that laws may be 
enacted for the regulation and control in the public interest of the exercise of this 
right. The Constitutional guarantee of freedom of association underpins the rights of 
citizens to form trade unions and provides the framework for regulating the right to 
be a member of a union (although the latter right comes with some significant 
qualifications). However, litigation involving the role of trade unions under Article 
40.6.1°(iii) has: 
 
‘…[a]lmost invariably concerned the protection of individuals in their relations 
with trade unions, rather than the protection of organised labour in its 
relationship with the State, or with employers pursuing anti-union policies. 
This may reflect the fact that unions have a traditional distrust of the law, 
preferring instead to rely on their industrial muscle in order to achieve their 
objectives’.6 
 
                                               
5
 Kahn-Freund, cit., p 4. 
6
 Hogan, G., and Whyte, G., JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution (4th ed, Dublin, Butterworths, 2003), p. 
1793. 
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While the Irish Constitution protects the right of freedom of association, unlike 
in many other Western democracies, trade unions in Ireland have no right to be 
recognised for bargaining purposes by an employer. Thus, while employees are free 
to join a trade union, they cannot insist their employer negotiate with that union 
regarding their pay and conditions.7 Employees and trade unions have traditionally 
gained the right to negotiate collectively with employers through the use, or threat, of 
collective action. This, of course, depends to a large extent on trade unions 
mobilising a critical mass of employees to join and to participate in trade union 
action.8 The principle that an employer is not constitutionally bound to negotiate with 
a union has been affirmed on many occasions. In Ryanair v Labour Court9 
Geoghegan J., in the Supreme Court, noted that it was ‘not in dispute that as a 
matter of law Ryanair is perfectly entitled not to deal with trade unions’: indeed the 
Judge went further in suggesting that ‘neither could a law be passed compelling it to 
do so’.10 
Neither is there a right at common law for workers to have their trade unions 
represent their interests in negotiations with employers. According to O’ Hanlon J. in 
Association of General Practitioners Ltd v Minister for Health:11 
 
‘I do not consider that there is any obligation imposed by ordinary law or by 
the Constitution on an employer to consult with or negotiate with any 
                                               
7
 Hogan and Whyte, ibid., p 1803.  
8
 Howlin, N. and Fitzpatrick, B., ‘The Feasibility of Mandatory Trade Union Recognition in Ireland 
Dublin University Law Journal (2007), 29(1), p. 178. 
9
 [2007] 4 IR 199. 
10
 ibid. at 215. This interpretation would seem to suggest that a legislative right to trade union 
recognition, such as exists, for example, in the UK, would be constitutionally prohibited. This will be 
discussed further below.  
11
 [1982] IR 382 at 391. 
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organisation representing his employees or some of them, when the 
conditions of employment are to be settled or reviewed. The employer is left 
with freedom of choice as to whether he will negotiate with any organisation or 
consult with them on such matters, and is also free to give a right of audience 
to one representative body and refuse it to another, if he chooses to do so’. 
 
This leaves only the legislative route. Unions can process ‘recognition’ claims 
under section 20 of the Industrial Relations Act 1969. This section allows workers (or 
their unions) concerned in a trade dispute to request the Labour Court to investigate 
the dispute as a whole, or allows the parties to a dispute to request the Court to 
investigate specified issues within the dispute.12 This would include disputes relating 
to union recognition. Recommendations issued by the Labour Court are binding on 
the party referring the dispute to the Court (i.e. the union) but not on the employer. 
As a result, recommendations under the 1969 Act that the employer should 
recognise the union in respect of those workers it had in membership were often 
ignored by employers.13 
As in the UK, collective agreements reached between unions and employers 
are typically not legally enforceable, as they generally do not intend to create legal 
relations.14 There are two exceptions to this general rule. Under Part III of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1946, collective agreements made between unions and 
                                               
12
 Note that, despite its moniker, the Irish Labour Court is not part of the regular court system, but is a 
statutory industrial tribunal, comprised of representatives of unions and employers, and chaired by a 
Government nominee. The Labour Court, depending on the nature of the dispute before it, may grant 
legally binding ‘determinations’ or ‘recommendations’, which are not legally binding.  
13
 Higgins, C., ‘The Right to Bargain Law: Is it Working?’, Industrial Relations News (2001), 45 
(online).  However, such a recommendation still allowed a union taking industrial action in support of 
recognition to show that it had done its best to abide by procedures.  
14
 O’Rourke v Talbot [1984] ILRM 587. 
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employers that are registered with the Labour Court are legally binding. While many 
of these are company agreements, they can be applied to all employers and 
employees working in a particular sector or industry, so long as the parties to such 
agreements are ‘substantially representative’ of workers and employers in that 
sector.15 The most important of these Registered Employment Agreements (REAs) 
are in the construction and electrical contracting sectors. These set minimum levels 
of pay (which exceed the national minimum wage) and other terms and conditions 
for workers in these industries. The second exception relates to Joint Labour 
Committees (JLCs), which are statutory bodies originally established under Part IV of 
the Industrial Relations Act 1946 to provide for the fixing of minimum rates of pay, 
and the regulation of employment, in industries and sectors where there is little or no 
collective bargaining and where pay and skill levels tend to be low. They are akin to 
the wages councils that existed in the UK until 1993.16  A JLC comprises of an 
independent chairperson appointed by the Government and representative members 
of employers and employees. The most important function of a JLC is to submit 
proposals to the Labour Court on fixing minimum wages and regulating conditions of 
employment for workers covered.17 If such proposals are confirmed by the Labour 
Court, through the making of an Employment Regulation Order (ERO), they become 
statutory minimum remuneration and statutory conditions of employment, which 
employers are not permitted to undercut in the contract of employment. The most 
significant JLCs exist in industries such as catering, hotels and retail. Recent 
developments in relation to the operation of both the REA and JLC systems, crucial 
for the argument outlined in this article, will be outlined below. 
                                               
15
 Industrial Relations Act 1946, section 27.  
16
 O’ Sullivan, M. and Wallace,, J. ‘Minimum Labour Standards in a Social Partnership System: the 
Persistence of the Irish Variant of Wages Councils’ Industrial Relations Journal (2011), 42, p. 18.  
17
 Industrial Relations Act 1946, section 42.  
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In recent years, the traditional pillars of adversarialism and voluntarism have 
come under stress. There has been much comment, both in Ireland and the UK, on 
the decline of the voluntarist model.18 Principally, this is because trade union density 
has dropped considerably in Ireland over the course of the last twenty years and now 
stands at approximately 31 percent (in the private sector, the figure is approximately 
25 percent).19 Many organisations (particularly in the service industries) do not 
engage in collective bargaining and do not recognise trade unions. The decline in 
trade union density and presence in the workplace has been accompanied by a 
corresponding decline in industrial action (usually taken as a measure of 
adversarialism), prompting some to identify a new ‘individualism’ amongst workers, 
which encompasses an ideological rejection of collective organisation and action.20 
At the same time, there are increasingly attempts by employers to individualise the 
employment relationship through the implementation of various human resource 
management (HRM) techniques, which often seek to bypass trade unions and foster 
employee commitment to the enterprise.21  Growing antipathy, in some cases 
bordering on oppression, towards unions by some major employers has also been 
documented.22 In certain cases, employer attention has shifted to the establishment 
of non-union structures for employee representation at work and, indeed, a number 
of obligations exist on employers in non-union settings to inform, and consult with, 
                                               
18
 See, for example, Redmond, M., ‘The Future of Labour Law’ Irish Employment Law Journal (2004), 
1 (1), p. 3; Colling, T., ‘What Space for Unions on the Floor of Rights? Trade Unions and the 
Enforcement of Statutory Individual Employment Rights’ Industrial Law Journal (2006), 35(2), p.140; 
Brown, W. et al, ‘The Employment Contract: From Collective Procedures to Individual Rights’ British 
Journal of Industrial Relations (2000), 38(4), p. 611.  
19
 http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries/Ireland/Trade-Unions 
(accessed 20 June 2013). Density figures in Ireland are disputed; this author considers that the figure 
quoted overstates density in the private sector, which is more likely to be below 20 percent.  
20
 Beck, U., The Brave New World of Work (Cambridge, Cambridge, 2000); cf. Kelly, J., Rethinking 
Industrial Relations: Mobilisation, Collectivism and Long Waves (London, Routeledge, 1998). 
21
 D’Art, D. and Turner, T., Irish Employment Relations in the New Economy (Dublin, Blackhall, 2002). 
22
 D'Art, D. and Turner, T., ‘Union Recognition and Partnership at Work: A New Legitimacy for Irish 
Trade Unions?’ Industrial Relations Journal (2005), 36(2), p. 121; O’Sullivan. M. and Gunnigle, P., 
‘Bearing All the Hallmarks of Oppression; Union Avoidance in Europe’s Largest Low-cost Airline’ 
Labor Studies Journal (2009), 34(2), p. 252. 
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their workers.23 These changes have been accompanied by an explosion in the 
volume of employment legislation over the last 20 years or so; from 1990 to 2010, 28 
major labour law Acts were passed; a huge volume for an area of law unused to 
statutory regulation.24 The enactment of important employment legislation in recent 
years has been driven significantly by developments at EU level. Moreover, the 
changing nature of the (increasingly globalised) labour market has demanded and 
generated legislative responses. In particular the growth in private sector service 
employment and the demands by employers for ‘flexibility’ in employment relations 
have seen an exponential growth in the numbers employed in ‘atypical’ work (most 
commonly part-time, fixed-term, temporary and agency work).25 Given all of this, 
some commentators have argued that it is now inaccurate to describe the Irish 
employment relations system as voluntarist, due to the decline in trade union density 
and voluntary collective bargaining and the parallel expansion in individual 
employment rights, which has arguably resulted in a transition from a bargaining-
based employment relations system to a rights-based system.26 It is important to 
note, however, that legislative developments have almost exclusively been 
concerned with individual (rather than collective) employment rights. 
The waning of trade union presence and influence at the workplace level 
became, throughout the 1990s, an issue of increasing concern for the Irish trade 
union movement. Ironically, this was in the context of the union movement finding for 
itself a new and crucial role in socio-economic governance at national level. From 
1987-2010, Ireland adopted a much-studied model of ‘social partnership’, whereby a 
                                               
23
 Doherty, cit., (n 4) p 73. 
24
 Doherty, M. ‘Developments in Legal Scholarship: Labour Law’ in Schweppe, J. and Mohr, T. (eds),  
30 Years of Irish Legal Scholarship (Dublin, Round Hall Press, 2011), p. 274. 
25
 Doogan, K., ‘Insecurity and Long-term Unemployment’ Work, Employment and Society (2001), 
15(3), p. 419. 
26
 Teague, P., ‘New Developments in Employment Dispute Resolution’ LRC Review (2005), 4, p. 5. 
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series of tripartite social pacts was concluded between the social partners; the State; 
the unions (represented by the only trade union confederation, the Irish Congress of 
Trade Unions- ICTU); employers (represented primarily by the main employers’ 
association, the Irish Business and Employers Confederation- IBEC- but also by 
sector specific groups, like the Construction Industry Federation); and what was 
termed the ‘community and voluntary pillar’ (a wide spectrum of civil society interest 
groups). The social pacts each ran for three years. While not legally binding, the 
pacts involved all parties making a wide range of commitments on virtually all issues 
of socio-economic governance, including setting pay rates for the public sector and 
the unionised private sector. Importantly, legislative measures affecting employment 
relations were agreed through social partnership (including, for example, a 
commitment to introduce a national minimum wage), which were then progressed 
through the normal legislative process. Social partnership, then, played a crucial role 
in setting labour standards since 1987. However, the process has effectively 
collapsed since early 2010, following the economic and unemployment crisis that 
has recently gripped the country, leaving Irish industrial relations in a state of some 
uncertainty and flux.27 During the partnership era, however, and in the context of 
declining trade union density in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as the Thatcherite 
attack on trade unionism evident in the UK, the issue of statutory recognition rights 
for trade unions became a key point of discussion during social partnership talks. 
The legislative outcome of this discussion is discussed below. 
Finally, it should be noted here that Ireland, as a Member State of the 
European Union, is of course, bound to respect the provisions of Title X of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which gives a privileged role in 
                                               
27
 See Doherty, M., ‘It Must Have Been Love…But It’s Over Now. The Crisis and Collapse of Irish 
Social Partnership’ Transfer: European Review of Labour Research (2011), 17, p. 371. 
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law-making to the social partners at both Union, and Member State, level, and Article 
28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which protects the rights of collective 
bargaining and collective action. Furthermore, Ireland has incorporated the 
European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law.28 Article 11 of the 
Convention guarantees the right of freedom of association. Finally, Ireland is also a 
signatory to ILO Conventions No 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise) and No 98 (Concerning the Application of the Principles of the 
Right of Organise and to Bargain Collectively).  
 
3. The ILO 
Before going on to look at the complaint with which this article is concerned in more 
detail, it may be useful to briefly outline the ILO system. The ILO is a tripartite United 
Nations agency that brings together representatives of governments, employers and 
workers to ‘set labour standards, develop policies and devise programmes’.29 The 
ILO Constitution lays down, in its preamble, basic labour principles and standards, 
which the Organisation seeks to promote and protect, including the principle of 
freedom of association. Other standards are laid down or elaborated upon in ILO 
Conventions and Recommendations. States that ratify Conventions are obliged to 
‘take such action as may be necessary to make effective’ their provisions.30 The 
ILO’s Governing Body is supported by Committees of Experts, which hear 
complaints that a State is not securing the application of a Convention right and 
                                               
28
 Albeit at a sub-constitutional level; see U. Kilkelly (ed), ECHR and Irish Law (2
nd
 ed, Bristol: 
Jordans, 2008). 
29
 http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 20 June 
2013).  
30
 ILO Constitution, Article 19(5).  
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which can issue recommendations directed at rectifying such matters. There is a 
regular and ongoing system of supervision (by the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations), but also a special procedure, 
based on the submission of a representation or a complaint. In 1951 the ILO set up 
the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) for the purpose of examining 
complaints about violations of freedom of association. Complaints may be brought 
against a Member State by employers' and workers' organisations. The CFA has 
nine members; an independent chairperson and three representatives each of 
governments, employers, and workers. If the CFA decides to hear a case, it first 
establishes the facts in conjunction with the government in question. If it finds that 
there has been a violation of freedom of association standards or principles, it issues 
a report through the Governing Body and makes recommendations on how the 
situation could be remedied. Governments are subsequently requested to report on 
the implementation of its recommendations.31 As with most international law 
procedures, the ILO system has no real method of sanction; ultimately it relies on 
goodwill and persuasion.  
 
4. Fasten Your Seatbelts: The ICTU Complaint  
The ICTU complaint32 centred on alleged anti-union behaviour and refusal to engage 
in good faith collective bargaining by the airline Ryanair, and the failure of Irish law to 
address these issues. The background to the dispute lies in the attempt to address 
                                               
31
 http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-
standards/committee-on-freedom-of-association/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 20 June 2013). 
32
 Case 2780; see the 363rd Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association (March 2012), p. 
207-231 (available at: http://www.ilo.org/gb/GBSessions/GB313/ins/WCMS_176577/lang--
en/index.htm, accessed 20 June 2013); hereinafter referred to as the “CFA Report’. 
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the aforementioned issue of a lack of statutory obligation on employers to negotiate 
with trade unions. Under the fourth social partnership agreement, Partnership 2000, 
a high-level group comprising trade union and employer representatives was set up 
to examine the issue. The result was the drawing up of the Code of Practice on 
Voluntary Dispute Resolution33 and the passing of the Industrial Relations 
(Amendment) Act 2001 (which was further amended in 2004; the Acts are cited as 
the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Acts 2001-2004).34 The Code of Practice and 
the 2001-2004 Acts explicitly exclude the imposition of any ‘arrangements for 
collective bargaining’ on the grounds of protecting Ireland’s voluntarist tradition.35 
The general philosophy behind both is that disputes relating to union recognition 
should be dealt with within the context of voluntary collective bargaining (with parties 
offered recourse to the advisory and conciliation services of the Labour Relations 
Commission - LRC).36 Thus, the legislation does not provide for union recognition but 
for a range of procedures to allow unions to seek to have specific disputes with 
regard to pay, terms and conditions of employment and dispute resolution 
procedures addressed.37   
The provisions of the Acts are used as a fallback measure whereby, in a 
situation where the parties cannot come to agreement under the ‘voluntary leg’ of the 
process, a union or excepted body38 may request a further investigation by the 
                                               
33
 SI No 145 of 2000. 
34
 See Purdy, K., ‘The Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001 and the Industrial Relations 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004 - Have they helped?’ Irish Employment Law Journal (2004), 1(5), 
p. 142.  
35
 Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001, s 5(2). 
36
 Kerr, A., The Trade Union and Industrial Relations Acts (3rd ed, Dublin, Round Hall, 2007), p. 279-
280. 
37
 Ryan, B., ‘Leaving it to the Experts - In the Matter of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 
2001’ Irish Employment Law Journal (2006), 3(1), p. 118. 
38
 ‘Excepted body’ is defined by section 6(3)(h) of the Trade Union Act 1941 (as inserted by section 2 
of the Trade Union Act 1942) and refers to ‘a body all the members of which are employed by the 
same employer and which carries on negotiations for the fixing of wages or other conditions of 
employment of its own members (but no other employees)’. This definition is directed towards a 
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Labour Court, which can issue a recommendation and, where appropriate, give its 
view as to the action that should be taken having regard the matters in dispute. 
Should the issue remain unresolved, the Court has the power to issue a legally 
binding determination on pay and terms of employment. If the employer does not 
comply with a Labour Court determination, the trade union may apply to the regular 
civil courts to enforce the order. Under the Acts, therefore, an employer may be 
compelled to grant union representatives the right to represent unionised employees 
on specified workplace issues relating to pay and terms and conditions of 
employment, but cannot be forced to make arrangements for collective bargaining.39 
To this end, the proposals amount to a set of dispute resolution procedures, rather 
than a means of promoting recognition per se.40 Nevertheless, some employers 
expressed the concern that the Acts effectively promoted a form of ‘back door’ union 
recognition by allowing unions to get their ‘foot in the door’ and, undoubtedly, the 
unions hoped that this would be the case.41 This outcome now seems less likely in 
the light of the Supreme Court decision in Ryanair v Labour Court.42 
The Ryanair case centred on a dispute between a number of pilots, members 
of the Irish Airline Pilots Association (IALPA, a branch of the Irish Municipal Public 
and Civil Trade Union, IMPACT), who sought to have the union negotiate with 
Ryanair about various issues on their behalf. Ryanair refused to negotiate and, as a 
                                                                                                                                                  
situation where a group of employees wish to negotiate collectively with their employer, but have no 
access to trade union representation (perhaps because of the very small size of the workplace). The 
idea of an ‘excepted body’ is to allow such workers to have the protections afforded to licensed 
unions.  
39
 Doherty, M., ‘Union Sundown? The Future of Collective Representation Rights in Irish Law’ Irish 
Employent Law Journal (2007), 4(4), p. 96. 
40
 Contrast, for example, the statutory procedure for gaining recognition rights that now exists in the 
UK under the Employment Relations Act 1999; see Dukes, R. ‘The Statutory Recognition Procedure 
1999: No Bias in Favour of Recognition?’ (2008) Industrial Law Journal, 37(2), p. 236.  
41 Doherty, M., ‘Representation, Bargaining and the Law: Where Next For the Unions?’ Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly (2009), 60(4), p. 383. 
42
 [2007] 4 IR 199. 
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result, the union invoked the procedures under the Acts. When both the Labour 
Court and the High Court found against it, Ryanair appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The case turned on the interpretation given to section 2 of the 2001-2004 Acts. This 
states that the Labour Court can only investigate ‘a trade dispute’ where it is satisfied 
that it is ‘not the practice of the employer to engage in collective bargaining 
negotiations’ and that the ‘internal dispute resolution procedures normally used by 
the parties concerned have failed to resolve the dispute’.  
Ryanair contended that it did engage in ‘collective bargaining’ as employees, 
including pilots, elected employee representatives to Employee Representative 
Committees (ERCs), which negotiated directly with the company on an ongoing 
basis in relation to all terms and conditions of employment. The Labour Court’s view 
was that if a group of employees unilaterally withdraws from the internal negotiating 
procedures (as had occurred in the instant case) it could not thereafter be said that 
the employer had a ‘practice’ of engaging in collective bargaining with them.43 The 
Supreme Court, however, interpreted the provision as requiring a decision on 
whether or not there was in place any permanent machinery, which would have 
obliged the management of Ryanair to sit around the table with representatives of 
the Dublin pilots and discuss matters of pay and conditions. Such machinery would 
need to have been established, in place and not ad hoc: however, the ‘practice’ did 
not cease to exist simply because the employees unilaterally abandoned it.44 The 
Supreme Court also held that an ‘ordinary dictionary’ meaning (not any distinctive 
meaning as understood in trade union negotiations) of collective bargaining was to 
be read into the legislation. The Court objected to the view ‘arguably hinted at’ by the 
                                               
43
 Ryanair v Impact/IALPA (LCR 18075/2005). All Labour Court decisions can be accessed at 
www.labourcourt.ie.  
44
 Ryanair v Labour Court [2007] 4 IR 199 at 217 per Geoghegan J. See also Iarnród Éireann v 
Holbrooke [2001] 1 IR 237. 
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Labour Court that collective bargaining in a non-unionised company must take the 
same form and adopt the same procedures as would apply in collective bargaining 
with a trade union. The Court reiterated that if machinery existed in Ryanair whereby 
the pilots had their own independent representatives who sat around the table with 
representatives of Ryanair with a view to reaching agreement if possible, this would 
seem to be collective bargaining within an ordinary dictionary meaning. 
 The Supreme Court was also quite critical of the procedures adopted by the 
Labour Court when hearing the case, in particular, the fact that neither a single pilot 
nor any other employee of Ryanair was called by the union to give evidence. The 
Supreme Court held that the Labour Court did not adopt fair procedures, first, by 
permitting complete non-disclosure of the identity of the persons on whose behalf the 
union was purporting to be acting and, secondly, by disbelieving the oral evidence of 
two senior management figures in Ryanair in the absence of hearing evidence from 
at least one relevant pilot who was an employee of Ryanair. The Labour Court had 
decided the issue against Ryanair to a large extent on foot of omissions in Ryanair 
documentation and on foot of a view put forward by the union that company did not 
engage in collective bargaining. This, according to the Supreme Court, did not 
amount to sufficient evidence to justify the finding. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
was critical of what it referred to as the Labour Court’s ‘mindset’, which favoured the 
way particular expressions are used and particular activities are carried out by trade 
unions.45 As a result of these procedural failings, the Supreme Court found, first, that 
the Labour Court had not adequately investigated if, in fact, there was a trade 
dispute; secondly, had not adequately investigated if internal dispute resolution 
                                               
45
 ibid. at 215 per Geoghegan J. 
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procedures had actually failed to resolve the dispute and, thirdly, had not ascertained 
if the Ryanair ERCs did, in fact, amount to collective bargaining machinery.  
 
5. ILO Convention No 98 
The ICTU complaint was essentially grounded on alleged breaches of four articles of 
the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention of 1949. Article 1 offers 
protection against acts of anti-union discrimination (e.g. insisting on non-unionisation 
as a condition of employment or dismissal for union activities). Article 2 protects 
against any acts of interference in the establishment, functioning or administration of 
employers’ or workers’ organisations (in particular, the establishment of workers' 
organisations under the domination of employers). Article 3 states that ‘machinery 
appropriate to national conditions’ shall be established to ensure respect for the right 
to organise. Finally, Article 4 states that measures appropriate to national conditions 
shall be taken to encourage and promote voluntary negotiation ‘with a view to the 
regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective 
agreements’. There are various strands to the complaint; for the purposes of this 
article, we can identify three, core (inter-related) elements.  
 
5.1 The ICTU Complaint 1: Conditional Benefits 
The first element in dispute related to an alleged contractual term concerning 
mandatory re-training for pilots. The allegation was that Ryanair had stated it would 
pay for this training, but that pilots were required to sign an agreement stating that 
they would be liable to repay the full cost of the training (€15, 000) if the company 
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was forced, within the following five years, to deal with the IALPA union. The ICTU 
argued that such a term amounted to an act of anti-union discrimination and that 
Ireland was in breach of Convention No 98 by virtue of the fact that Irish law does 
not render such terms unlawful. The Government responded that this particular term, 
in fact, was not at issue in the Supreme Court case and quite possibly would be 
unlawful, given that Irish law offers stringent protection against anti-union 
discrimination, noting, in particular, the Code of Practice on Victimisation.46 The CFA 
concluded that the allegation, if true, would amount to ‘interference’ under Article 2 of 
Convention No 98;47 it recommended, therefore, that the Government should, with 
the social partners, review the relevant protective legislation to ensure such acts are 
prohibited.  
 
5.2 The ICTU Complaint 2: Irish Law and Employee Representation 
At the core of the complaint, however, was the impact of the Ryanair decision on the 
representation of employees under Irish law. ICTU contended that the effect of the 
decision was that Irish law allows the establishment of fora with negotiation and/or 
consultation rights, which act as inducements to workers not to support collective 
bargaining with unions. It claimed that Ryanair’s ERC was ‘a sham’, that it had a 
consultative role at best (not a genuine negotiating role) and that it was clearly not 
independent from the company (given the control Ryanair had over the 
establishment and operation of the ERC).48 Worse still, according to ICTU, was that 
the existence of such a body as the ERC, following the Supreme Court judgment, 
effectively gave the company immunity from proceedings under the 2001-2004 Acts. 
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ICTU pointed, with alarm, to the Supreme Court holding that the Labour Court 
procedure was, overall, fundamentally unfair to the company because no pilot or 
other employee of the company appeared in Court to support the allegations of the 
union. In this context, ICTU expressed ‘deep concern’ at the Supreme Court’s 
requirement that employees of a multinational company come forward and publicly 
give evidence against their employer in a dispute between a trade union and their 
employer.49 
This aspect of the claim was vigorously defended by the Government and IBEC. 
The Government argued, first, that a body such as an ERC did not amount to a 
‘workers’ organisation’ and so was not subject to Article 2 of the Convention (which, 
it argued, also respects employers’ rights not to negotiate with unions). IBEC argued 
that staff associations are permitted by the Convention and, indeed, may be required 
by EU law (citing, by way of example, obligations under the Information and 
Consultation Directive).50 Furthermore, Irish law did protect the right to organise and 
guaranteed protection against both interference (by way of affording unions wide 
discretion in the conduct of ballots for industrial action, for example) and against 
offering ‘anti-union’ inducements to employees (via the Code of Practice on 
Victimisation). Secondly, both the Government and IBEC pointed out that the 
Supreme Court had not actually determined whether the Ryanair ERCs were, in fact 
sufficiently independent. This was a matter for the Labour Court to determine, in light 
of the legal guidance given by the Supreme Court; as the case had never gone back 
to the Labour Court for final determination, there was nothing to suggest that a 
properly raised claim under the 2001-2004 Acts would not have been successful. 
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On these points, the CFA was somewhat sceptical. It noted that Article 4 of the 
Convention clearly emphasises the role of workers’ organisations as one of the 
parties in collective bargaining. The CFA went on to suggest that, since the creation 
of bodies like ERCs can constitute a ‘preliminary step’ towards the setting up of 
independent and freely established workers’ organisations, all official positions in 
such councils should be occupied by persons freely elected.51 The CFA noted that 
an employer’s bypassing of representative organisations in favour of direct 
negotiation with employees can be detrimental to the promotion of voluntary 
collective bargaining and that the existence of elected representatives should not 
operate to undermine union representatives (where both are present). As a result, 
the CFA recommended that the Irish Government should set up an independent 
inquiry into the alleged acts of interference in Ryanair.  
 
5.2 The ICTU Complaint 3: Voluntary Collective Bargaining 
The third, and closely related, limb of the complaint centred on the right to bargain 
collectively under Irish law. ICTU argued that the effect of the Supreme Court 
decision left Irish law in violation of the core principle of voluntary collective 
bargaining, as it allowed employers to impose a particular structure of negotiations 
on workers, with persons neither selected nor elected by the workforce. Essentially, 
according to ICTU, the Ryanair decision ‘consecrated a new constitutional right for 
companies to operate free of unions’.52 The Irish Government responded that this 
was a questionable interpretation of the Supreme Court judgment, and that the 
‘positive and aspirational’ duty to promote collective bargaining could not be 
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considered breached by reference to the ‘idiosyncratic facts’ of one particular case.53 
The Government noted that Ireland has, in general, taken many steps to promote 
collective bargaining; for example, via the process of social partnership in which 
trade unions played a significant role, ‘unparalleled in most other countries’.54 IBEC 
argued that there exists no requirement under international law to mandate union 
recognition and pointed out that Irish law, consistent with its voluntarist tradition, 
respects a ‘diversity of arrangements’ for negotiation, collective bargaining and 
consultation.55 
Again, the CFA seemed somewhat unconvinced, pointing out that it ‘firmly 
believes that the right to bargain freely with employers with respect to conditions of 
work constitutes an essential element in freedom of association, and trade unions 
should have the right, through collective bargaining or other lawful means, to seek to 
improve the living and working conditions of their members’.56 The CFA 
recommended that the Government, with the social partners, should review the 
existing legal framework and consider any appropriate measures, including 
legislative measures, so as to ensure respect for the freedom of association and 
collective bargaining principles. It also recommended that the parties review the 
mechanisms available with a view to promoting machinery for voluntary negotiation 
between employers’ and workers’ organisations for the determination of terms and 
conditions of employment.  
 
6. An Irish Solution? 
                                               
53
 Ibid., p. 219. 
54
 Ibid., p. 219. 
55
 Ibid., p. 230. 
56
 Ibid., p. 231. 
 22 
The outcome of the Ryanair case has resulted in a scenario whereby Irish law offers 
perhaps the weakest protection for trade union bargaining rights in the Western 
industrialised world. The current state of play is interestingly summed up the facts of 
a case referred to the Labour Court, involving the US multinational corporation 
(MNC), Dell.57 In 2009, the company sought to introduce a number of changes to the 
terms and conditions of employment of 52 workers. Thirty-four of the workers raised 
objections to the new working arrangements. Subsequently, Dell engaged in a two-
month consultation process, which involved team meetings, individual meetings and 
the establishment of a ‘24/7 information website.’ During this process, several 
changes and concessions in regard to the proposals were made by management. 
Notwithstanding this, a number of employees sought representation by a trade union 
(the Communication Workers Union) under the terms of the 2001-2004 Acts. The 
Labour Court refused to investigate the substantive claim, holding that the 34 
workers, in fact, constituted a ‘collective body’, satisfying the Supreme Court test. By 
the time of the hearing, some 13 of the original 52 had accepted voluntary 
redundancy and left the company. However, the Court found that, as a majority of 
the remaining workers appeared to have accepted the changes proposed by 
management, collective bargaining had taken place and a valid agreement had 
come into existence. Those who wanted union representation in the matter were 
denied this; a number instituted individual cases against the company for breach of 
contract.   
 The facts and outcome of this case require little comment. Suffice to say, it is 
unlikely that what occurred would strike many familiar with labour law and practice as 
amounting to ‘genuine collective bargaining’. Likewise, it must be concerning that, of 
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the workers in dispute originally, a number either left the company or were forced to 
institute individual proceedings against the employer.  
The Irish coalition Government (on taking office in 2011) promised to ‘reform 
the current law on employees’ right to engage in collective bargaining (the Industrial 
Relations (Amendment) Act 2001), so as to ensure compliance by the State with 
recent judgments of the European Court of Human Rights’ and reiterated this 
commitment to the CFA.58 The Government has a number of options. One would be 
to amend the Constitution, in order to allow a broader interpretation of Article 
40.6.1.iii than currently exists under Supreme Court jurisprudence. A second option 
would to introduce a statutory procedure whereby unions could seek to gain 
mandatory collective bargaining rights, as exists, for example, in the UK (following 
the introduction of the Employment Relations Act 1999). This would require a new, 
statutory definition of collective bargaining, perhaps along the lines of the definition 
laid down by the Labour Court itself (but struck down by the Supreme Court):59   
‘Collective bargaining comprehends more than mere negotiation or 
consultation on individual employment related issues including the processes 
of individual grievances in relation to pay or conditions of employment. In the 
industrial relations context in which the term is commonly used it connotes a 
process by which employers or their representatives negotiate with 
representatives of a group or body of workers for the purpose of concluding a 
collective agreement fixing the pay and other conditions of employment 
applicable to the group of workers on whose behalf the negotiations are 
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conducted.  
 
Normally the process is characterised by the involvement of a trade union 
representing workers but it may also be conducted by a staff association, 
which is an excepted body within the meaning of the Trade Union Act, 1941, 
as amended. However an essential characteristic of collective bargaining, 
properly so called, is that it is conducted between parties of equal standing 
who are independent in the sense that one is not controlled by the other’. 
 
A further option is to strengthen support for non-union collective 
representation structures. For example, the legislation transposing the Information 
and Consultation Directive, the Employee (Provision of Information and Consultation) 
Act 2006, provides a template of sorts in its ‘standard fall-back provisions’, which, for 
the purposes of establishing an information and consultation forum, contain rules of 
procedure, rules on the election of employee representatives, rules on the structure 
of any information and consultation body to be set up and rules governing complaints 
and disputes.60 Under the Directive, of course, information and consultation on 
certain matters must be with a ‘view to reaching agreement’ and, in Junk, the Court 
of Justice gave quite an expansive interpretation to what is to be understood as 
‘consultation’.61 The most likely option, in the view of this author, however, is that 
some attempt will be made to ‘fix’ the 2001-2004 Acts, emphasising the voluntarist 
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nature of the legislation. Whether a formula can be found to return to a ‘pre-Ryanair 
position’ is another issue. In any case, the argument here is that the actual outcome 
of this process will add little to its significance; it is submitted, as presented below, 
that we can already pinpoint the crucial lessons that can be learned from this ‘Irish’ 
problem.  
 
7. An Irish Problem?  
7.1. Living in an Anglo World 
Legal protection for collective bargaining rights is currently in bad shape in the Anglo 
world. The statutory procedure in the USA (under the ‘Wagner Act’) and the more 
recent statutory procedure introduced in the UK have not been seen as particularly 
successful in securing robust protections for unions and their members, especially in 
the face of employer resistance.62 Bogg has noted the dominant influence of the 
‘Wagner Act’ model and ‘its theory of majoritarian consent’ which has spread like a 
‘virus’ across the English-speaking common law world.63 The features of such a 
model have not been not hospitable to unions in these countries. Unions must 
organise a majority of workers in support of collective bargaining before any rights 
can be granted, making it difficult and costly to get a foothold, and leaving workers 
open to pressure or intimidation, if the employer is hostile; rights must be ‘triggered’ 
(usually via workplace ballots, which can lead to delays and conflict) rather than 
being automatically granted; and the rights gained are procedural (the right to talk 
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with the employer) rather than granting any entitlement to substantive outcomes. 
Relatively weak union movements (such as exist in the UK, US and, arguably, 
Ireland) are unlikely to prosper in such a model without strong regulatory intervention 
by the State. However, as long as the State sees its role as confined to ‘the 
aggregation of worker’s preferences’ rather than ‘promoting…collective bargaining 
as a public good’, public policy support seems unlikely.64 
 In this context the argument made by IBEC in relation to the Information and 
Consultation Directive is interesting. It had been felt by some commentators that 
strengthened information and consultation rights in the UK and Ireland, in particular, 
would be highly significant in promoting employee voice at work given that neither 
had a ‘general, permanent and statutory’ system of information and consultation or 
employee representation.65 Such hopes were soon dashed, as a weak transposition 
in both countries has resulted in the Directive making little or no impact.66 It is ironic 
in the extreme, however, that the existence of obligations under the Directive (which 
very few Irish employers fulfil) is cited as an argument by an employers’ 
confederation in support of the view that ‘staff associations’ can legitimately provide 
a representation role in place of trade unions.  
It is also somewhat ironic that the Irish Government referenced the social 
partnership process as an example of public policy support for collective bargaining. 
The social pacts agreed between 1987 and 2010 were never legally binding; the 
implications of this became blindingly obvious when, in late 2009, as part of its 
response to the worsening economic crisis, the Government (and IBEC) simply 
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resiled from the agreement in place and collapsed the process.67 Following two 
emergency budgets in 2009 and 2010 (both of which introduced public sector pay 
cuts), the Government then concluded a new four-year Public Service Agreement 
(the ‘Croke Park Agreement’), under which it was agreed to protect public sector pay 
levels, in exchange for a reduction in employee numbers and a substantial 
commitment to organisational reform. In 2013, the Government announced it wanted 
to renegotiate the terms of this agreement. The resulting Haddington Road 
agreement promises another round of pay cuts for public servants; members of 
unions that refuse to sign up to the agreement will have their pay cut by legislation.68 
So much for voluntary bargaining! 
 
7.2. Judge, Jury and Executioner? 
 Given this context, it may also be unsurprising that union movements in Anglo 
systems have a somewhat jaundiced view of the judiciary. Indeed, it has been 
persuasively argued that the Irish judiciary, in a number of major areas of 
constitutional interpretation, frequently tends to defer to individual values, and 
particularly individual property rights (including the right to run a business), over 
those of the community or collective groups. 69 In this context, again, it is somewhat 
disingenuous of the Irish Government and IBEC to argue that, as the Ryanair case 
never returned to the Labour Court for a final determination, Irish law on employee 
representative bodies may not be as restrictive of trade union rights as ICTU claimed 
in its complaint. This view misses (or ignores) the stridency of the language used by 
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the Supreme Court. It also wilfully ignores the clear disfavour with which the 
Supreme Court viewed the procedures adopted by the Labour Court (which is, recall, 
an industrial relations tribunal and not part of the regular court system). The Court 
felt that factual issues in dispute should be resolved on oral evidence from parties 
who participated in the process or who could give first hand evidence on how the 
employer’s procedures operated. Therefore, direct evidence on any issue is 
generally to be preferred to a legal submission, or an opinion or references to 
documents unsupported by direct evidence.70 This, clearly, requires the identification 
of individual union members. The reference here to an ‘opinion’ is also worrying for 
the unions, as, in order to protect employees’ anonymity, it is not untypical in cases 
such as these for a union official to outline the employee case. It is interesting to 
note in Ryanair that Hanna J., in the High Court,71 pointed out that whether or not 
oral evidence is offered in a case is a call made on a daily basis by advocates before 
the ordinary civil courts, where parties are free to offer viva voce evidence or not as 
the case may be. He went on to observe that, while there might be circumstances in 
which the Labour Court might take a more ‘activist role’ in determining what oral 
evidence it might wish to hear (for example, where there is a marked imbalance of 
‘fire power’ in the representation of the parties before it) this was not such a case.  
This idea of pressure on unions to disclose to courts and tribunals sensitive 
information regarding membership has interesting parallels with the view posited by 
some that the result of the Court of Justice’s decisions in cases like Viking could well 
be that unions, in order to defend the proportionality of industrial action in claims 
relating to EU free movement rights, could be forced to disclose to national courts 
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and tribunals potentially oppressive volumes of materials on internal union strategy, 
tactics and policy.72 Of course, judicial hostility (or underestimation, at least) of the 
value and role of collective labour rights is not confined to the common law world. It 
scarcely needs adding that, in the ‘Laval Quartet’ series of judgments: 
 
‘[t]he Court rewrote the role of social actors, using only the fundamental 
freedoms pen… It forced the flexible, heterodox and autonomous social 
regulation entrusted to trade unions into the rigid and narrow space resulting 
from the application of the broad scope and long tentacles of fundamental 
freedoms….[i]n the mind of the Court, the social conflict is replaced by the 
Court’s unilateral definition of the rules of the game’.73  
 
It remains an open question as to whether the influx of Judges from the ‘new’ 
Member States, with perhaps a more ‘Anglo’ sense of the resolution of disputes 
involving economic and social rights have permanently altered the ‘rules of the 
game’.  
 
7.3. The Corporate Takeover 
A further aspect of the case which is of interest beyond the confines of Irish labour 
law relates to the power of MNCs to influence public policy. Crouch has recently 
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described what he refers to as the ‘corporate takeover of the market’; the idea that 
neo-liberalism (at least in Anglo-American capitalist societies) has resulted in the 
preferential treatment of large organisations (rather than rigorous enforcement of 
competition laws) and the market dominance of global corporations (rather than 
small and medium-sized enterprises), which the modern State is too weak to 
effectively regulate.74 As a small, export-led, open economy, Ireland has a strong 
dependence on foreign direct investment (FDI). Partly due to historical and cultural 
factors, FDI from US-based MNCs has been traditionally crucial. During the 1970s 
and early 1980s, the Irish state-backed industrial development agencies actively 
encouraged incoming companies to conclude agreements with particular unions.  By 
the mid-1980s, however, state agencies began ‘marketing’ Ireland as a non-union 
environment, at least in part as a response to the increasing reluctance of US MNCs 
to recognise unions.75 Therefore, the possibility that a statutory duty to engage in 
collective bargaining could be imposed in Ireland has been more or less ruled out as 
a ‘potential threat to inward investment’.76 This is despite, incidentally, the fact that 
analysis of the operation of the 2001-2004 Acts showed clearly that almost three-
quarters of cases involved indigenous Irish firms, and that the vast majority involved 
relatively low-paid and low-skilled groups of workers (not the ‘high-tech’ employees 
of powerful corporations based in Ireland, like google and Intel).77 The role of 
powerful non-state actors like the American Chamber of Commerce Ireland (the 
representative body for US companies based in Ireland at both Government and 
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industry level) has become ever more pronounced.78 The role of powerful domestic 
MNCs should not be forgotten either; no public inquiry into Ryanair (as 
recommended by the CFA) has been held.  
 
7.4. A Market in Union? 
Here, the role of the EU institutions must again be considered. It had been tentatively 
suggested that the 2001-2004 Acts might have proven increasingly significant 
following the judgments in the ‘Laval Quartet’. At the centre of these well-known 
decisions is the Court’s view that, where collective agreements are not declared 
universally applicable, extended erga omnes to non-union workplaces, or their 
provisions protected, in some way, by Member State legislation, they cannot be 
imposed on service providers from EU jurisdictions operating in a Member State 
other than that of origin.79 All that can be required of such service providers is that 
they observe statutory minima terms and conditions of employment. The Labour 
Court, however, in exercising its jurisdiction under the legislation had, effectively, 
begun to ‘benchmark’ employers against others in the sector in question, and 
recommend that, where employers fall below the general, prevailing industry pay and 
conditions standards (as located by the Court), they would have to raise standards to 
that level.80 As these prevailing standards were frequently identified as those set 
down by national pay agreements (negotiated with ICTU) or those applicable in 
unionised employments in the relevant sector, this provided a clear method for the 
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setting of an industry wide ‘fair rate for the job’ (by a tri-partite, State industrial 
relations tribunal). This approach, however, has been emasculated by the decision in 
Ryanair.  
 Perhaps more worrying, however, has been the recent intervention by the 
European Commission and the European Central Bank, which, along with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), make up the ‘Troika’ to which Ireland applied for 
financial support, which was granted in 2010. The Memorandum of Understanding, 
outlining the terms of the financial support package for Ireland, contained little in the 
way of suggested labour law reforms, but did include a specific commitment by the 
Government to ‘review’ the Registered Employment Agreement and Joint Labour 
Committee systems (outlined in section 2) with follow-up actions to be agreed with 
the European Commission.81 This review was to be carried out in order to ensure 
there were no distortions of wage conditions across sectors associated with the 
presence of sectoral minimum wages in addition to the national minimum wage. Irish 
labour law regulation (as noted in section 2) is comparatively light. Where legislation 
exists, it focuses almost exclusively on providing a floor of minimum rights for 
individual workers. Statutory provisions supporting collective bargaining are almost 
non-existent and bargained standards that exceed statutory minima (in terms of pay, 
working time, etc) are either achieved by trade unions through the deployment (or 
threat) of industrial action, in the public sector by virtue of the (legally non-binding) 
Croke Park Agreement, or in sectors covered by JLCs or REAs; the last mentioned 
being the one area where the Troika demanded Government action.82 Thus, we see 
the drift from bargained standards to statutory minima continue (aided and abeited 
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by the European Commission). In any case, the Troika need not have been 
concerned. The Irish superior courts have, in two recent decisions, struck down both 
the REA and JLC systems as being unconstitutional in that they, first, grant too much 
law-making power to a non-Parliamentary body (the Labour Court) and, secondly, 
represent an unwarrented interference with the property rights of employers.83 A life 
jacket for trade unions in an Anglo world was never likely to come from the local 
judiciary; it seems unlikely, in light of recent developments, that it will come from 
Brussels, Frankfurt or Luxembourg either.  
 
8. Conclusion 
Over the past 30 years, trade unions in Ireland have engaged in various 
‘revitalisation strategies’, including a focus on servicing members, organising and, 
most notably, entering into social partnership arrangements.84 The 2001-2004 Acts 
represented an attempt to bolster the partnership process at national level by 
encouraging voluntary employer-union interaction at the workplace, with the fall-back 
of imposing certain legal obligations, in the event voluntary engagement was 
unsuccessful. The legislation, it has been argued, proved relatively beneficial to 
unions in arguing cases before the Labour Court, but was effectively neutered by the 
Irish Supreme Court. It has been noted above that the general trend away from 
collectively bargained standards in Ireland fits well with the EU picture (in terms of 
the decisions of the Court and the policy priorities of the EU arms of the Troika). It 
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was this that led the ICTU to take its complaint to the ILO. Whilst it has been noted 
that the language of the CFA recommendations indicated some concern at the 
extent to which ILO Convention rights are being vindicated in Ireland, the CFA did 
not explicitly uphold the complaint; rather, it recommended that a number of matters 
be reviewed. This outcome is not, given the structure of the CFA, necessarily 
unexpected, but it illustrates the ‘soft’ nature of ILO jurisprudence. As Brodtkeb 
rather cuttingly, if somewhat unfairly, argues (in the context of the exclusion of small 
businesses from the UK’s statutory recognition procedure): 
 
‘[t]his failure is not unique, or even particularly unusual, among UK 
employment laws...in contrast to the ILO, the UK government is charged with 
managing and trying to grow a large and complex economy. It may be 
forgiven for preferring practicality principle’.85 
 
So, is there any area of international law that might prove valuable to the 
unions in this context? The Irish Government has pledged to reform collective 
bargaining law to comply with recent decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights.86 In cases such as Demir and Baykara v Turkey87 and Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v 
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Turkey,88 the Strasbourg Court has held that the right to collective bargaining is 
protected by Article 11 of the ECHR and that the right to strike constitutes an 
important aspect in the protection of trade union members. In Demir, the Court ruled 
that the right to collectively bargain with an employer in principle had become one of 
the ‘essential elements’ of the right to form and join trade unions, guaranteed under 
Article 11 of the ECHR. The Court held that Article 11 of the ECHR encompasses a 
right not to have prohibitions imposed on the freedom of trade unions to engage in 
collective bargaining. The Court seemed to suggest that the absence of legislation 
necessary to give effect to provisions of international law (in particular ILO 
Conventions), protecting collective bargaining rights might be in breach of the ECHR. 
According to Ewing and Hendy, this could mean serious difficulties for states like 
Ireland where ‘the Supreme Court appears to be inching its way towards a position 
where the implied constitutionally protected right not to associate means…that 
employers have a right not to recognise [a union]’.89 Ewing and Hendy further 
contend that the Court of Justice decisions in the ‘Laval Quartet’ (and, it is submitted 
here, the Ryanair decision) cannot be reconciled with the European Court of Human 
Right’s requirements of a legal regime that ‘(i) recognises the right to collective 
bargaining (and the duty to take steps to promote it), (ii) respects the right to take 
collective action, and does so (iii) in accordance with international labour 
conventions and regional labour standards’ (emphasis added).90 
 Whether a re-fashioning of recent jurisprudence along the lines of that of the 
Strasbourg Court is possible, given the global inhibiting factors outlined in section 9, 
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is an open question. The outcome in Ireland perhaps reflects the danger of 
legislative rights being ‘bolted on’ to a voluntarist system where ‘norms’ of 
adversarialism and power imbalance are accepted. It also suggests the potential 
dangers for union movements (particularly, but not exclusively) in voluntarist systems 
of excessive reliance on legal solutions. However, to quote Machiavelli: 
‘There is no need of legislation so long as things work well without it, but, 
when such good customs break down, legislation forthwith becomes 
necessary’. 
 
